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What Attachment to Peace? Exploring the Normative and Material Dimensions of Local 
Ownership in Peacebuilding 
 
Abstract: The peacebuilding and academic communities are divided over the issue of local 
ownership between problem-solvers who believe that local ownership can ‘save liberal 
peacebuilding’ and critical voices claiming that local ownership is purely a rhetorical device to 
hide the same dynamics of intervention used in more ‘assertive’ interventions. The article 
challenges these two sets of assumptions to suggest that one has to combine an analysis of the 
material and normative components of ownership to understand the complex ways in which 
societies relate to the peace that is being created. Building on the recent scholarship on 
'attachment', we claim that different modalities of peacebuilding lead to different types of social 
'attachment' - social-normative and social-material - to the peace being created on the part of its 
subjects.  
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Introduction 
Peacebuilding without the keywords ‘local’ or ‘national’ combined with ‘ownership’ has 
almost become unthinkable nowadays, a situation exemplified by the discursive use of these 
concepts in United Nations peacebuilding since the 2000s.i For policy-makers, ‘local ownership’ 
is more often than not used as a generic term, without further explanation or specific definition, 
implying that everyone knows what is meant by it.ii Actually, far from being consensual, the 
concept of local ownership is at the very centre of current academic debates on peacebuilding. 
For one group of scholars, local ownership is considered as a necessary institutional response to 
recent difficulties experienced by peacebuilding missions, exemplified by faltering legitimacy of 
dominant peacebuilding institutions, provided that peacebuilders get the balance right between 
not enough and too much involvement.iii But critical voices have problematised this observation, 
arguing that ownership has often come to remain superficial to only disguise the fact that power 
still remains in the hands of dominant and wealthy institutions, both national and international, 
while local agency is manipulated and instrumentalised for the purposes of the former.iv In that 
sense, contemporary discussions of local ownership often end up either endorsing the concept or 
alternatively altogether critiquing it. To paraphrase Latour on a very different conversation (the 
social scientists’ discourse on objects), the debate becomes divided between two irreconcilable 
positions, considering the phenomenon as either ‘too weak or too strong.’v However, these 
monolithic accounts are not satisfactory. We aim to contribute to this literature, and possibly 
nuance the claims, by highlighting the multi-faceted nature of ownership, and by breaking down 
the ‘social’ element of local ownership in different components, which, as we claim, are both 
normative and material in nature. 
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Looking at the material and normative dimensions of peacebuilding enables us to 
highlight specific, contemporary, trends in the field of international peacebuilding, which may 
have been obscured in current debates. The starting point here is the liberal peacebuilding 
debates,vi where the liberal peace refers to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be 
more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than ‘illiberal’ 
states. Liberal peace encompasses socio-cultural norms associated with peacemaking, as well as 
the international and national structures instrumental in promoting it. Economic considerations 
are also central in the model, for liberal peacebuilding implies ‘the globalisation of a particular 
model of domestic governance—liberal market democracy—from the core to the periphery of 
the international system.’vii The failure of many liberal peacebuilding attempts to produce a 
sustainable peace is often not a result of a lack of material ownership, which we see as having 
been successful in creating material connections between interveners and local elite. Instead, one 
could argue that despite strong attachments to the material aspects of peacebuilding, many 
societies have not developed strong attachments to the normative dimensions of international 
interventions and have thus been reluctant to take ownership of a version of peace that seems 
distant from the realities of everyday life at local level. This is perceived as being distant from 
“everyday social realities”, which, in many post-conflict societies, include customary processes 
and institutions, indigenous forms of knowledge, traditional authorities, elders, chiefs, 
communities, tribes, and religious groups.viii In that respect, discussing material and normative 
dimensions of peacebuilding enables us to look at different possible scenarios, including cases 
where social-material dimensions are strong but have created feeble social-normative attachment 
to peace or cases where deep social-normative attachment to peace is noticeable despite – or in 
spite of – superficial social-material ownership. 
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 The lack of engagement with the different dimensions of the local ownership of 
peacebuilding has not only been obvious in peacebuilding practices, but also in the ways in 
which academic discourses have framed the concept of ownership. Such discourses have tended 
to assume a natural and almost de-politicised connection between material and normative 
attachment to peace. We will challenge the tendency to take for granted the link between social-
material and social-normative attachments to peace and instead assume that the different 
intensities and logics of attachment to peace condition the relationship between societies and 
interveners. In that respect, the sustainability of peacebuilding must be viewed in its constituent 
components, both material and normative.  
  
Our observations are based on our long-term engagement with a variety of post-conflict 
contexts, but in this case will draw specifically from data collected during fieldwork in Bosnia-
Herzegovinaix between 2008 and 2011. It struck us that there is disillusionment among 
international and local actors, in Bosnia and elsewhere, about how the abstract idea of local 
ownership can be implemented efficiently and meaningfully. It is interesting to observe that the 
academic literature seems to be in line with this trend, torn between the need to enhance the 
structure of local ownership and the utmost disillusionment with it. It is out of such observations 
that this article addresses the complex nature of local ownership, proposing a move away from a 
unified view on ownership as present or absent, and rather moving towards a multi-faceted 
concept which addresses the different types of social attachments to peace. We will therefore 
first look at the notion of ‘attachment’, mainly, but not exclusively, drawing on Latour’s 
conceptualisation of attachment to use this as the basis for the development of a theoretical 
model of different scenarios of peacebuilding attachment, before illustrating this with the 
example of Bosnia. One general caveat needs to be introduced here. While we have found 
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Latour’s discussion on attachment particularly fecund for our object of study, we have to specify 
that we consider ourselves to a certain extent sociologists of the social,x and hence we have to 
distance ourselves to a certain extent from Latour’s ontology of the collective. We do agree with 
Latour and the Latourians that the ‘social’ has to be more than an ‘established domain of reality’ 
to include ‘what is connected or associated,’xi but we won’t engage with networks between 
human and non-human actors in this current piece. Nevertheless, we hope that the exploration of 
the social-material dimension of ownership - however partial and limited it will be - will open 
future perspectives for research on non-human actantsxii and their connections to the networks of 
peace.  
  
Attachment 
The concept of attachment has its roots in a body of literature prominent in psychology and 
mainly goes back to the work of John Bowlby.xiii In his studies leading to the development of the 
concept of ‘attachment’, Bowlby concluded that attachment was a bond to other people, 
developed in the early childhood stages of a person, framing their connectedness to other people 
in their environment. However, while being further developed in the discipline, the concept of 
‘attachment’ transcended the field of psychology and came to be used in different fields. In the 
business literature, it is often cited in relation to commitment to work and as a trigger of 
motivation of workers.xiv We can therefore see a close connection between attachment and 
agency in this literature, given that the former seems to facilitate the latter. Where there is 
attachment, there is motivation and commitment to act. Agency traditionally reflects the human 
capacity to act, a capacity that manifests itself in a social world in which structures impact upon 
the opportunities and resources available in a constant interplay of practices and discourses.xv In 
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the light of attachment, we view agency in the variety of network strings an actor is embedded 
in, and the more connections an actor has, the higher their capacity to act. At the same time, we 
need to acknowledge that not all attachments carry to same meanings and strengths. For instance, 
in their study on social capital in neighbourhood circles in Iowa, Hays and Kogl distinguished 
between formal and informal attachments as well as the differing ways in which such 
attachments play out socially and materially.xvi In that respect, we can argue that attachments 
differ in their strength, but also in their quality, thus impacting upon the ways in which they 
materialise in any given society. 
  
In the context of the socio-psychological functions of attachment, Marris provides a set of 
roles that attachments can play.
xviii
xvii He first argues that attachments serve as a way of dealing with 
as well as controlling the uncertainties that people face in their everyday lives. Secondly, 
attachments provide a sense of security and trust in society. Finally, Marris suggests that 
attachments give us a sense of how to understand power and control in larger terms. These 
observations are of high relevance in their reading of attachment as situated in the everyday and 
representing a way of dealing with its associated uncertainties. If we assume that (post-) conflict 
societies are faced with a particularly high degree of socio-political as well as material 
instability, then the ways in which people find attachment in different regimes, norms or groups, 
can be considered particularly relevant to making sense of the socio-economic underpinnings of 
peace and peacebuilding. Attachment then determines the extent to which societies will want to 
own peacebuilding in terms of taking control over its design in the long run. In that sense, this 
discussion has found an echo in the burgeoning literature on hybrid peace,  especially in terms 
of its ability to reflect on the cognitive and emotional links between the peace being created and 
those experiencing its everyday implications. In that vein, the different types of attachment that 
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we outline in this article are a manifestation of hybridity, that is, the encounter of local and 
international power relations and their respective visions of and engagement with the 
peacebuilding process. The different types of attachment therefore point to different (hybrid) 
forms of peace, both as process and outcome of the nature of attachment. 
  
But more than the psychological literature, we believe that Bruno Latour’s 
conceptualisation of attachment is particularly relevant to the understanding of the various 
attachments to peace. Pointing to our network-like connections in society, the key question he 
asks is ‘whether we are well or poorly bound.’xix In that sense, attachment can be seen as 
essential bonds conditioning the social constellations we are situated in, while placing us in 
closer proximity to some rather than to others. At the same time, Latour emphasises that we need 
to move beyond the binary of attachment and detachment and instead move towards a 
conceptualisation which frames the strengths of attachments. We are therefore faced with 
societal constellations in which certain attachments are much stronger than others, because, 
echoing Marris’ preoccupations, they are better placed to respond to the uncertainties of 
everyday life. In that respect, the strength of our attachments in society is shaped by a number of 
factors emerging from our everyday lives. Resistance to certain forms of attachment is therefore 
not necessarily ‘detachment’, but a stronger degree of attachment to alternative agents or 
connectors. In this context, we note that Latour’s notion of attachment assumes that 
emancipation does not necessarily mean to be ‘“freed from bonds” but well-attached.’xx As a 
result, agency emerges not from detachment, but from the embeddedness of the networked in 
multiple webs and connections. The more connected an agent is to diverse agents and mediators, 
the more agency (s)he has in the transformation of such webs. In that sense, suggesting that 
action is ‘overtaken or […] other-taken’, Latour is mainly interested in seeing how the networks 
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we are embedded in shape our activities and actions.xxi This certainly raises questions about the 
location of agency as, according to Latour, agency arises out of the multiplicity of connections 
we are embedded in, which can be employed to open up possibilities and opportunities. Against 
this background, the multiple connectors that the peacebuilding jigsaw offers (local, national, 
regional, international and so forth) frames and channels agency through the diverse modalities 
of attachment to those. 
  
At the same time, this also means that we can never be ‘unattached’, although we can 
substitute one attachment for another.xxii Attachment can thus be said to become a manifestation 
of agency in that people are most closely connected to the attachments which make most sense to 
respond to the challenges of their everyday lives. We may therefore ask: Which elements of 
social and political life do people become attached to and want to own, which ones do they feel 
are unnecessary or even a nuisance to them? Against the background that we view attachment as 
a manifestation of agency, we claim that attachment is a connection resulting from the challenges 
of everyday life, rather than simply oppression or force. It points to the agency of people to link 
with policies, actors and norms they want to build strong bonds with, and which ones they feel 
should be kept at a safe distance, without implying a structural over-determination of 
attachments. This rather means that ‘the social’ becomes visible through ever-changing 
attachments to the peace being created in the complex politics of the peacebuilding landscape. 
Here, rather than suggesting a particular ontology of peace, we are interested in the ways in 
which local actors feel connected to the goals that peacebuilding agencies are working towards, 
in all their complexity. Do local actors approve of the general direction in which the 
peacebuilding project is going? How and to what extent do they associate with the project at 
stake? Latour indeed suggests that we can only perceive the social ‘when new associations are 
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being made.’xxiii Thus the continuously transforming peacebuilding landscape with its shifting 
discourses around who owns the politics of peace can be seen as a landscape of agency in which 
new attachments are constantly (re-)created while others are being weakened and replaced in the 
light of their role in wider social networks.   
 
The Rise of the Local Ownership Agenda 
Before engaging with the question as to why certain contexts have produced stronger 
attachment to peace than others, we first need to introduce the recent development on local 
ownership in contemporary peacebuilding, as well as what we consider our contribution to these 
debates. This literature is based on a simple observation: after a decade of evolution toward more 
‘integrated,’ ‘multi-faceted,’ or simply stated more intrusive peace operations, with the high 
point being the United Nations administrations of Kosovo and Timor-Leste at the beginning of 
this century, the peacebuilding literature has started to take heed of the ‘unintended 
consequences’ agenda
xxvii
xxiv to integrate in its analysis all facets of interventions and not only those 
accounted for traditionally by peacebuilding actors themselves. Debates around sovereignty and 
rules of engagement, which were so central in the first half of the 1990s,xxv gave way to 
discussions on authority and international administrations at the end of the 1990s.xxvi However, 
the difficult experiences in Iraq, Timor-Leste and Kosovo in turn led to new discussions on the 
means of intervention, and to a renewed interest in the concept of local ownership. In this 
context, local ownership is understood as a process where the solutions to a particular society’s 
needs are developed in concert with the people who are going to live with, and uphold, these 
solutions in the long run.  This renewed interest from the peacebuilding community draws 
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heavily on conflict transformation,xxviii security sector reformxxix and development and aid 
literatures.xxx  
  
More specifically in the context of peace- and state-building, after having been a 
preeminent architect of the international administrations in Kosovo
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxvi
xxxi and Timor-Leste, Kofi 
Annan rediscovered the virtues of recognising local agency before passing the relay to Ban Ki-
Moon. In 2002, national ownership became ‘the single most important determinant of the 
effectiveness of capacity-building programmes,’  while two years later, the UN recognised 
that no international initiative ‘imposed from the outside can hope to be successful or 
sustainable.’  This approach will be repeated in the opening session of the Peacebuilding 
Commission,  and pursued by Ban Ki-Moon,xxxv reflecting to a certain extent his ‘do more 
with less’ approach.   
 
The shift from intrusive, ‘top-down’ interventions to a renewed interest in ‘local 
ownership’ has been a central feature of the evolution of the international intervention in Bosnia. 
The international intervention first took the form of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), known as the Dayton Accord, which endorsed the 
establishment of a High Representative to ‘mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and 
coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies’xxxvii involved with the civilian 
aspects of the peace agreement. After a first period marked by a low-key approach by the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), combined with a consolidation of Serb, Bosniak and Croat 
hard-line position, and frustrated by the manifest lack of progress, the OHR saw its prerogatives 
considerably expanded after the Bonn Summit of the Peace Implementation Council of 
December 1997. In the words of the former High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch, the 
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introduction of the so-called ‘Bonn Powers’ ‘shifted the equation of the international presence in 
favour of the civilian implementation efforts and brought Bosnia closer to a protectorate-like 
status.’xxxviii The OHR started to dismiss more and more public officials, from mayors up to 
members of the collective State Presidency for obstruction against the implementation of the 
Dayton Accord. Moreover, the OHR immediately started an integrationist legislation for state 
and society by decreeing laws on citizenship, the flag, the national anthem, the currency, 
ethnically neutral licence plates and passports: all laws the nationalist parties could not agree on 
in the Parliamentary Assembly.  
 
After a period of heavy intervention into local politics under the High Representative 
Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative Christian Schwartz-Schilling saw his role in 
his capacity ‘to oversee the transition from today’s quasi-protectorate to local ownership.’xxxix . 
In that respect, it could be observed that ownership increasingly became central to the European 
Union’s increasing engagement in the country. The need to close the Office of the High 
Representative as one of the conditions for EU membership made clear that the EU wanted to 
take less responsibility for the political fate of the country and to include a sovereign BiH as a 
member state. The issue of local ownership has been addressed and viewed as one of the main 
challenges for Bosnia’s reconstruction period by a number of international players.xl At the same 
time, most agencies seem to explicitly state a lack of local ownership over the peacebuilding 
process. Particularly in interviews with World Bank, EU and OHR representatives between 2008 
and 2011, the lack of ownership was emphasised as one of the most pressing challenges of post-
conflict Bosnia. This problem was mainly ascribed to the nature of cooperation with local 
authorities, which were often viewed as complex or even problematic.xli At the same time, the 
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local population seems to be more divided about the need to strengthen ownership, or 
alternatively, whether to ask for even stronger degrees of intervention.xlii 
Interestingly enough, however, neither local nor international narratives tend to define the 
concrete meaning of ownership in the case of Bosnia, and a linkage between material and 
normative ownership is taken for granted. Instead, from an institutional perspective, local 
ownership is viewed as a political process, which is expected to spill over into diverse elements 
of society, both socio-political and economic. The EU understands ownership as the ‘attempt to 
make people responsible for their own decisions, ideally through passing on knowledge to people 
from the EU, that is, from EU practice to local partners.’xliii However, segments of the local civil 
society resent being perceived as ‘a subcontractor for the EU’ implementing its policies such as 
democratisation and reconciliation and in the process serving as a legitimating device for the EU 
to claim local legitimacy and ownership rather than imposition.  
 
 Opening Up the Local Ownership Discussion: Social-Material and Social-Normative 
Aspects of Attachment to Peace 
This rise of the local ownership agenda - conceptualised as part of the ‘local turn’ in 
peacebuildingxliv - has been met with uneven reception in the peacebuilding literature. On the one 
hand, and if we accept the Coxian dichotomy of problem-solving and critical thinking,xlv  the 
‘problem solving’ literature welcomes the newfound interest in local ownership as a way to 
bolster the process of international institutional promotion of global norms of good governance 
and its legitimacy. An appropriate transfer of powers to legitimate local representatives allows 
external statebuilders more time for as sustainable completion of the mandate while enabling the 
host society ‘to develop the ground for a sound political and civic culture.’xlvi In this regard, local 
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ownership, as well as discussion on how to increase participation and consultation, is understood 
as integral to the ‘sequencing debate.’xlvii
xlviii
lviii
 Hence, ownership is seen as a decisive condition to 
increase the quality and accountability of interventions,  especially if the ownership extends 
beyond national government to include civil society and the broader public.xlix In contrast, the 
critical literature generally portrays the rise of the ‘local ownership agenda as a ‘rhetorical 
device’l or ‘rhetorical cover,’li more aspirational than concrete,lii used to legitimize external 
control.liii The statement ‘there is much talk of ownership, but often this is not much more than 
lip service’liv seems to encapsulate the general argument made by this eclectic group of scholars 
– an argument generally supported by robust empirical data, one should add. Power 
redistribution – implied in the local ownership discourse – is considered marginal and does not 
involve a fundamental rethinking of the meaning and location of power.lv Hence, the term 
‘ownership’ is understood to imply ‘varying degrees of local control that are typically not 
realized.’lvi Of course, this raises problems with respect to the ownership of peace, not only in 
the tension between international and local actors, but also at a local level. This is particularly the 
case when local elites have to adopt a political arrangement or agenda drafted and conceived by 
international actors, likely in cooperation with selected civil society actors.lvii Such a situation is 
likely to lead to ‘confrontational peacebuilding’ between local elites and peacebuilders.  
Hence, while the literature we have reviewed above indeed highlights the complexities of power 
asymmetries in the negotiations of ownership, it has rarely investigated the type of ownership 
that is being promoted.  
  
Against this background, it appears fruitful to open up the debate by distinguishing two 
distinct dimensions of local ownership: what we will call social-normative and social-material. It 
is worth reminding that both dimensions are social in nature, and thus constitute two faces of the 
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same social phenomenon – ownership of international peacebuilding in this case. Both 
dimensions however trace different forms of associations, and design different types of 
connections. By social-material, we denote the dimension shaped by an incentive system set in 
the framework of the wider peacebuilding operation, which is tied to particular gains, financial, 
political or otherwise economic. The social-material dimension of peace includes socialisation by 
local actors in donor structures for instance. For analytical purposes, we distinguish this 
dimension from the social-normative dimension, which digs deeper into the underlying 
normative assumptions of the peacebuilding project and mirrors a value-based identification 
process of local actors with the peace project being promoted by locals or international actors. 
This dimension includes the current normative agenda promoting ‘good governance,’ 
‘reconciliation’ or ‘human security’ among other normative end-goals of international 
interventions. In a sense, the attachment to the social-material dimension of peacebuilding can be 
read as the willingness on the part of local actors to engage with international incentive 
structures and accept the social-material connections that bind international and local actors 
together, while attachment to the social-normative dimension reflects a degree of preparedness to 
own its normative underpinnings and contents, embracing the international peacebuilding 
normative agenda in terms of language and meanings.  
 
Different peacebuilding scenarios 
In effect, most of the literature on ownership focuses on normative aspects while 
marginalising material implications. By including social-material and social-normative 
dimensions of ownership, we suggest four ideal-typical situations.  
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A shallow and superficial social-normative ownership (situation 1 in Table I below) 
encompasses logics of co-optation and discursive politics, aptly exposed by the critical literature. 
Social linkages between international and local structures are weak and tenuous, producing a 
situation that can easily be manipulated in turn by local political entrepreneurs to bolster a 
resistance agenda.lix In contrast, deep social-normative ownership (situation 2 in Table I) is 
marked by shared values and a successful process of norm diffusion and as such constitutes the 
‘ideal’ endgame of a successful process of liberal peacebuilding. It is the logical extent of a 
successful local ownership process, as premised by the most enthusiastic proponents of liberal 
peacebuilding, but rarely happens in practice without meaningful distortions and re-interpretation 
of the values promoted in the first place. 
 
Table I: Dimensions of ownership 
 Superficial Deep 
 
Social-normative 
 
(1) Cooptation, lip-service 
 
 
(2) Value internalisation 
 
 
Social-material 
 
(3) low degree of 
interpenetration of the ‘two 
worlds’; grassroots, ‘bottom-
up’ processes 
 
 
(4) Communalisation; 
Dependency creation 
 
 
On the social-material axis, superficial social-material ownership (situation 3 in Table I) 
describes situations marked by either feeble linkages between international and local structures 
exemplified by the instrumentalisation of funding sources by local actors (sometimes out of 
necessity) and by international actors (to legitimise a certain set of policies), or situations where 
17 
material interactions between donors and recipients are simply not a driving force behind the 
peacebuilding process. It can be conceptualised from a critical perspective as a low-degree of 
interpenetration of the ‘two worlds’lx marked by risk mitigation strategies and the proliferation of 
gated-communities,lxi or alternatively as processes that mirror the elusive grassroots, bottom-up, 
processes that are not relying, in theory, on external funding and external support to operate. 
Deep social-material ownership (situation 4 in Table I) encompasses hybrid processes where 
there is socialisation of locals into donor structures as well as donors’ socialisation into specific 
local practices. Hence, the socialisation process in the material sphere is co-constituted by the 
liberal peacebuilding vision of what constitutes acceptable ‘civil society’ on the one hand (and 
which project and/or organisation should be funded), and local actors serving as ‘gatekeepers’ of 
their own communities on the other (through a process of understanding the ‘rules of the game’ 
to meet donors requirements). This process can be led by and lead to a ‘mushrooming’ of NGOs 
as donor instruments,lxii thriving in the ideal environment constituted by aid flows. At the same 
time, this situation can include a plurality of processes depending on the approach one takes to 
understand, ranging from the communalisation of interests – postulated by the problem-solving 
literature as the result of a successful locally-owned process – to outright dependency creation. 
Even if situations involving extensive aid flows will tend to be represented as a ‘deep social-
material’ situation if only by the sheer amount of specific interactions between local and 
international actors in donor structures that aid processes entail, the social-material axis is not a 
proxy for a quantitative analysis of material aid flows but is rather specifically tied to the 
socialisation process linked to material structures.  
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If we return to the literature on local ownership, critical scholars correctly point to the 
superficial social-normative nature of many ownership practices by underlining the co-optation 
at work and the lip service paid to local ownership (situation 1 in Table I). Based on this 
observation, they tend to postulate an essentially shallow or discursive form of social-material 
attachment, centred on the instrumentalisation of funding sources and legitimisation discourses 
(situation 3 in Table I; see also table II below). Starting from the opposite side of the equation, 
problem-solvers apprehend the ownership debate from a social-material ownership perspective, 
looking at the process of socialisation into donor structures and rules that is an integral part of 
liberal peacebuilding (situation 4 in Table I). From that premise, they postulate that local 
ownership of the material aspects of peacebuilding necessarily contributes to a stronger, deeper, 
and more meaningful process of norms diffusion into wider society, leading to a deeper form of 
international-local attachment (situation 2 in Table I; see also Table II). Both accounts starts 
from a valid starting point and are, to a certain extent, compatible; not unlike the elephant and 
blind men metaphor,lxiii the local ownership debate depends on which part of the intervention 
architecture one stresses. 
 
Table II: Assumptions of problem-solving and critical theory 
 Superficial Deep 
 
Social-normative 
 
(1) Cooptation, lip-service 
 
 
(2) Value internalisation 
 
 
Social-material 
 
(3) low degree of 
interpenetration of the ‘two 
worlds’; grassroots, ‘bottom-
up’ processes 
 
 
(4) Communalisation; 
Dependency creation 
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Instead of a debate revolving around the limited or unrestricted potential of local 
ownership for liberal peacebuilding, the inclusion of different dimensions of ownership enables 
us to present a more subtle account of peacebuilding processes, where ownership can at the same 
time be elusive and tangible, deep and superficial. We therefore suggest taking the argument a 
step further by claiming that attachment to the peace being built is both cause and result of its 
ownership. As argued above, attachment varies in nature and strength, so a low level of 
attachment to the elements of peace is linked to superficial-discursive ownership, while stronger 
bonds of attachment to, and thus engagement with, peacebuilding is likely to lead to deeper 
forms of ownership of peace. Attachments reflect the ways in which people are connected with 
or disconnected from the politics of peace and therefore how they deal with the associated 
uncertainties present in the everyday challenges emerging in post-conflict societies. This is in 
essence what Roger Mac Ginty alludes to when he states that ‘it does seem that many 
international peace-support actors are more comfortable thinking about and exercising material 
forms of power, while local communities in some settings tend to think about power in terms of 
legitimacy and moral standing.’lxiv The question as to whether peace is owned on a superficial or 
deep level can be read as a manifestation of agency, in terms of the extent to which societal 
groups are attached to the peace being created. The depth of ownership must therefore not be 
viewed in isolation of the social underpinnings of peace, as the varying degrees of attachment to 
it reflect a socio-political landscape of competing narratives around peace and conflict. 
 
Three caveats need to be introduced. First, our argument does not imply a necessary 
outcome or route between the different situations described above. On the one hand, we outline 
connections between categories which are likely in the current binarisation of thinking of local 
ownership, that is, an assumed link between situation 4) and 2) by the problem-solving approach 
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(situation number IV in Table III below), or the link between situation 3) and 1) for the critical 
scholarship (situation number I in Table III). We also suggest that, in the cases we are familiar 
with, this binarisation has to be broken up to account for the transformation of deep social-
material ownership into superficial social-normative ownership (situation number III in Table 
III). However, while we postulate that this process is the most likely one in the context of heavy-
footprint liberal peacebuilding interventions, this is not to suggest that this route or connection is 
automatic.  
 
Table III: Possible ownership connections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, when we look at the local ownership discussion in Bosnia to situate different 
projects and actors in the different scenarios, we also have to take into account the fact that no 
(post-) conflict situation is ever stable or static. In contrast, we need to account for the fluid 
nature of transitions to peace and the development of diverse forms of local ownership. In that 
respect, we can only situate case study scenarios in that space if we also consider the time-
dimension, that is, the particular stage any case may find itself in at any given moment. We 
therefore suggest that post-conflict cases can always move from one to another form of 
attachments. Indeed, superficial social-normative ownership can deepen over time, or become 
weaker. Along similar lines, social-material ownership can become deeper or more superficial, 
    Normative 
    Superficial Deep 
  
Material 
Superficial 
  
(I) Discursive and limited 
(postulated by critical 
approaches) 
(II) Endogenous 
  
Deep 
  
 (III) Dependency 
creation and limited 
value internalisation 
(IV) Successful  
(postulated by liberal 
peacebuilding) 
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depending on how the networks of actors involved in the peace- and state-building process 
construct their attachment to the peace being created.  
 
Third, whereas the aggregate collective actions of external donors tend to lead to a 
peacebuilding process that can be described as either superficial or deep on the social-normative 
and social-material axes – leading to broad assessments such as ‘liberal peacebuilders have failed 
create a sustainable peace in Iraq, Kosovo or Timor-Leste’ – individual actors or programmes 
have logics of their own, creating their own attachment to peace. Certain dynamics on the ground 
can lead to a strong attachment to peace (whether social-normative or social-material) despite a 
general failure by international actors to connect the peace agenda to the everyday needs of the 
local population. The reverse can also be true. With this in mind, we suggest to disaggregate the 
different connections to peace in Bosnia, looking at each scenario in turn and with the hope of 
providing a more textured approach to the various possible attachments to peacebuilding. 
 
Exploring ownership connections in peacebuilding in BiH 
Situation (I): Superficial social-material and superficial social-normative attachment to 
peacebuilding 
Not only in BiH, but also elsewhere, has the lack of attachment to liberal peacebuilding often 
been ascribed to the prevailing and ongoing dominance of ethnic identities. Ironically, in BiH 
this lack of attachment is not just a coincidence or result of ancient hatreds, but has instead been 
institutionalised by the Dayton Peace Agreement, which, despite its symbolic role as safeguard 
of the liberal peace in BiH, has institutionalised ethnic divisions through the ethnicisation of 
politics. lxv  Sven Simonsen suggests that voters primarily kept voting for ethnic political 
parties,lxvi even ten years after the end of violent conflict. This seems at odds with the EU’s 
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efforts to de-ethnicise the country’s divided police force and political landscape, despite 
Dayton’s consociational arrangements. Indeed, the EU’s efforts to create a joined police force 
remained without much success and were unable to fully reform the Bosnian police into one 
unified force. Berg suggests that this is not least a result of the fact that the underlying political 
landscape remains ethnically divided and thus the Bosnian police force not amenable to profound 
reform.lxvii
lxviii
 In that respect we can argue that the persistence of ethnically-orientated policies in 
BiH represents a serious obstacle to the extent to which liberal peacebuilding can operate. It puts 
into question the effort of the liberal peace to achieve cross-ethnic reunification and de-
ethnicisation. In this context, policies such as Milorad Dodik’s questioning of a government 
report of Srebrenica,  Dragan Covic’s return to power despite past allegations of abuse of 
power against him or Bakir Izetbegovic’s ethnically-laden and controversial speech in Oxfordlxix 
are all indicators of nationalistic policies rejecting the general framework of liberal 
peacebuilding.  
 
At the same time, this is not to demonise a lack of attachment to peacebuilding as a necessarily 
nationalistic or ethnic practice, although resistance can take these forms. The lack of attachment 
to peacebuilding can also be a conscious choice for actors who feel the framework does not 
promote peace in an adequate way, but who still resist ethnic or nationalist sentiments. For 
instance, when taking a look at the role of artists and cultural actors in Bosnia, the decision of 
many artists to keep their attachment to peacebuilding at a low profile reflects a disagreement 
about what peacebuilding should look like.lxx The fact that, very generally speaking, artists in 
BiH seem to have a superficial socio-material attachment to liberal peacebuilding can be said to 
be due to two aspects. On the one hand, there is a general mistrust of artists as far as 
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internationally-sponsored projects are concerned. Ambrosia, an association of artists, for 
instance, have a stated goal of creating an alternative (social and arts) scene, not through 
(internationally-sponsored) NGO mechanisms, but just by acting as “crazy artists.”
lxxii
lxxi In that 
respect, conditional funding can represent an obstacle to the work they do. On the other hand, 
Western donors often feel uncomfortable funding artists. As one official stated, cultural 
organisations do not tend to get funding as they do not have the capacity to comply with the 
funding guidelines.  Hence, cultural actors are not seen as capable of developing a social-
material attachment to the peacebuilding project.  
 
In terms of the social-normative attachment to peacebuilding, we argue that, rather than 
signifying that artists are not attached to peace, the disconnect between artists and international 
peacebuilders reflects a lack of attachment to international peacebuilding. In that sense, many 
artists feel attached to the complex and competing visions of peace to the development of which 
they contribute, whilst staying fairly disconnected from international (usually EU-driven) 
peacebuilding.  
 
A similar point in case is the public protests that took place all over the country in 2014. The 
citizens’ movement that led to the protest was internally grown and not inspired through any 
international project funds. Citizens went onto the streets to protest against corruption, nepotism 
and for social justice. The movement then went on to create lasting structures, the so-called 
‘plenums’. These citizen-based discussion fora were efficient in the sense that they created 
inclusive structures of citizen participation in politics, forced politicians to resign and to ask for 
more accountability. In that sense, one could think that this would be the ideal-type situation in 
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terms of what the Dayton Peace Agreement for 1995 would have envisaged: a locally-owned, 
and internally-driven peace order in which the citizens feel they have a stake. It may therefore 
come as a surprise that the protests were greeted with suspicion at best among the international 
community present in BiH. Indeed, rather than endorsing the protests, High Representative 
Valentin Inzko traced the protests to a less active role of the Office of the High Representative, 
implying that the protests were linked to a need for more international intervention. lxxiii
lxxiv
 
Wolfgang Petritsch, former High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, similarly associated the 
protests with hopelessness of the Bosnian people and called for a more pro-active EU approach 
to intervention,  saying 
[t]he EU High Representative for External and Security Affairs along with the 
Commission and the newly appointed Commissioner, Austrian “Gio” Hahn […] will 
have to put the European Union’s West Balkan policy on a “political” and more 
assertive footing.lxxv  
 
What this reflects is an interesting tension on the part of the international community, namely 
the, at least rhetorical, need to promote liberal values in BiH, while on the other hand showing a 
certain degree of suspicion as to whether local actors are even capable of promoting those values 
without international tutelage. On the part of local actors, this in turn means that they remain 
suspicious in terms of attaching their own peace work to the framework of the liberal peace, 
which often seems to fail to understand grassroots concerns.  
 
These examples show that a superficial attachment to both the social-material and social-
normative dimensions of peacebuilding cannot be read as detachment from peace or necessarily 
an alliance with ethno-national objectives (although this may be one possibility). What the 
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examples of local artists or the 2014 protest movement suggests is, much in contrast, deficiencies 
within the peacebuilding project in its inability to connect to local imaginaries of peace.  
 
Situation (II): Superficial social-material and deep social-normative attachment to 
peacebuilding 
Situation two describes a situation in which the normative underpinnings of peacebuilding are 
locally endorsed, while their material nature remains fairly independent from international 
funders. One example to cite here is the recent developments in sports, and more specifically, 
football. This sport has long been a source of nationalism and ethnic division in Bosnia. This was 
particularly obvious when, in 2011, UEFA and FIFA suspended the country’s Football 
Association as the latter consisted of three, rather than one, presidents, to cater for the ethnic 
division of the country. Indeed, this intervention eventually led to institutional change – the 
election of one single president in 2012 – and can be considered a central step in countering the 
ethnic divisions, not only in BiH’s political, but also social and cultural landscape. Vest suggests 
that overall, nationalistic sentiments in football have started to shift, while the BiH national team 
is increasingly supported (or at least not rejected) by the different ethnic groups.lxxvi
lxxvii
lxxviii
 This can be 
read as a result of an institutional and social reframing of the national team, which has been said 
to have been instrumental in bringing ethnic groups together rather than merely dividing 
them.  Vulliamy even goes as far as arguing that “[t]hroughout, the Bosnian national side 
itself – and teams like FK Sarajevo – have on the pitch been the country's only functioning multi-
ethnic organisations.”  Such developments can be said to be in line with the long-term 
ambition of peacebuilders to unlock divided social structures and generate cross-ethnic 
collaboration. Although not representing peacebuilding actors in the narrow definition of the 
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word, it seems that UEFA and FIFA have created an institutional incentive for cross-ethnic 
cooperation to take place in the sphere of football.  
 
At the same time, the amount of international funding committed to peacebuilding-through-
football has been limited. Although there have been a few internationally-funded NGO projects 
specifically dedicated to using football as a means of facilitating peace,lxxix football has mainly 
been funded through local businesses, politicians and state / government funds.lxxx Peacebuilding 
in this sphere has thus not been very costly for international peacebuilders, but has connected to 
its framework of cross-ethnic collaboration and institutionalisation. 
 
This is somewhat similar to the work that numerous youth centres all over BiH are doing. Often 
without access to funding, they represent shared spaces in many divided or war-torn towns. 
Carabelli, for instance, casts light on the youth centre OKC Abrasevic, located on the former 
front line in Mostar, citing the centre’s website: 
The Youth Cultural Centre ABRAŠEVIĆ believes that a different Mostar is possible and wants to build 
an open society based on civic ethics. In fact Abrašević is seeking for and applying alternative formulae 
in the fields of culture, economy and politics as an answer to negative trends present in BiH society.lxxxi  
 
Carabelli suggests that the centre symbolises and stands for the values of justice and solidarity as 
well as reducing polarisation and creating ‘spaces of difference.’ lxxxii
lxxxiii
 A public lecture in the 
centre indeed suggests that it aims to be a ‘space of trust’ to the local youth in a divided city.  
Similarly to what the 2014 protests had aimed to achieve, these values can be said to be 
fundamentally liberal ideas, that is, ideas that liberal peacebuilders would be expected to endorse 
as well. It is therefore striking that the youth centres are finding it hard to, or are sometimes not 
willing to, access international funds. The youth centre Alter Art in Travnik, for instance, was 
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originally set up as an NGO, but the founder then changed his mind as he realised that he did not 
want to become an administrator, but instead spent his energy on providing a space in which 
people could express themselves freely. lxxxiv
lxxxv
lxxxvi
 This example reflects the extent to which 
attachment to the material underpinnings of peacebuilding can put actors at risk of losing energy 
they could instead spend on peace work itself. This is certainly not always the case – indeed, the 
youth centre in Srebrenica did receive EU monies for their work on activism and 
reconciliation.  What it reflects, however, is a potentially arising friction between the need to 
engage with the socio-material conditions of peacebuilding on the one hand, and an attachment 
to its socio-normative components on the other. The paradox lies in the fact that, at its origin, the 
reconciliation literature and approach presupposes predominantly an attachment to the ideational, 
perhaps even spiritual, components of peacebuilding.  However, this becomes increasingly 
difficult to achieve in the absence of funds, so actors who focus on the socio-normative 
dimension of peacebuilding will often find it harder to implement their projects. 
 
Situation (III): Deep social-material and superficial social-normative attachment to 
peacebuilding 
This situation is, as we claim, the most common constellation in situations in which the transfer 
of international authority to local ownership has failed to produce deep social results and has 
mainly focused on the social-material aspects of the cooperation. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we can 
observe a strong connection between international institutions and local actors on a social-
material level, while those links hardly turn into long-term social-normative attachments to the 
peace that is being built. The aspect of international peacebuilding which seems to feed into local 
practice is therefore a socialisation into donor structures instead of joint agenda of hybrid 
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peacebuilding, of which local actors would take ownership. Interviewees often mentioned the 
need to obtain better access to funding and to obtain training to improve their funding 
proposals.lxxxvii
lxxxviii
lxxxix
 In this context, it has been suggested that people are very clever in figuring out 
what donors want to hear,  while mutual engagement with the social-normative agenda 
between donors and recipients seems to remain limited. It can indeed be said that international 
donor money has created a peace industry in which peace has become a business, a platform on 
which jobs can be created, that is, a sphere heavily dominated by the market. An NGO worker in 
Bosnia, for instance, emphasised that, in most cases, projects are being implemented for the 
money, while the NGO sector has turned into a profit-sector.  Belloni described this situation 
during the course of which we can observe a mushrooming of NGO in the presence of 
international actors as a way of reinforcing dependence of local on international structures.xc In a 
similar vein, Pelliciari outlines how, after the war in BiH, a number of new organisations 
emerged, while organisations that had previously worked in a different field shifted their agenda 
to development and conflict work due to the availability of funds in this area. xci While the 
mushrooming of NGOs in response to the war can certainly not be labelled as an illegitimate act, 
it describes a phenomenon during the course of which social-material attachment to 
peacebuilding happens very quickly, while not necessarily (but possibly) being accompanied by 
a social-normative attachment to the overall peacebuilding project.  
 
Situation (IV): Deep social-material and deep social-normative attachment to peacebuilding 
In terms of the desired sustainability of peacebuilding, an attachment to it based on both its 
social-material and social-normative underpinnings is the ideal-type situation from the 
perspective of the international peacebuilders. We notice that in BiH, peacebuilding remains 
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fragile and somewhat disconnected from local structures due to the rare occurrence of this 
situation. Indeed, it is actually difficult to come up with case studies which illustrate this ideal 
type. One organisation that seems to come close to this scenario is Mozaik, an organisation based 
in Sarajevo and pursuing a variety of projects throughout the country. The NGO is well-funded 
by international grants and thus needs to concentrate a large part of its energy on the 
administrative aspects of its work. Staff emphasised their need to maintain a professionalised 
finance department as well as keeping good links to a variety of donors, including the World 
Bank, UNDP and the EU.
xciii
xcii While this describes an attachment to the social-material component 
of peacebuilding, the organisation also suggests an attachment to its social-normative 
components. Indeed, trigger words such as ‘social capital’, ‘social and economic development’ 
and ‘building trust’ are part and parcel of the organisation’s approach.  It becomes obvious 
that there is a connection between those terms and those used by the larger international donors 
represented in BiH. From the perspective of the EU, a frequent funder of the organisation, this 
represents an ideal situation in that its funds have led to a social-normative attachment to the 
international peacebuilding mission over time. Of course, what remains to be discussed here is 
the extent to which this strong attachment to peacebuilding results in the creation of sustainable 
peace or instead the perpetuation of (potentially illegitimate) structures of external dominance.  
 
 
Conclusion 
  This article has attempted to explore the different configurations that attachment to 
international peacebuilding can take on the ground, and as such has attempted to go beyond the 
unsatisfactory representations offered by both the liberal peacebuilding scholarship and the 
critique of it. By breaking down the concept of local ownership into its social-normative and 
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social-material dimensions, and by linking this discussion to the attachment literature, this article 
has suggested a theoretical framework that opens up the analysis of peace processes beyond 
success and failure and explores the various scenarios, crystallised around four ‘poles’ or ‘ideal-
types’. The different scenarios have also been illustrated through the use of case studies from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, looking at ways that attachments to peace have been translated into 
everyday coping mechanisms, which can range from rent seeking behaviour to reconciliation 
practices for instance. The different case studies - which are not meant to be in-depth case 
studies but rather illustrations of the different ideal-typical poles – reflect the extent to which 
peacebuilding has varied in terms of who owns it and in what ways – normatively or materially. 
Therefore, the article suggests that discussions around the extent to which local ownership has 
been created (or not) have to be approached in a more nuanced way than what the existing 
literature has done. The link between social-material and social-normative ownership is therefore 
not natural as often assumed, but politicised and conditional on the nature of peace that is being 
promoted as well as the networks of actors that engage with it, or refuse to do so. It is not least 
due to this aspect that the success and failure of local ownership is deeply contested. 
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